Certi…ers verify unobserved product characteristics for buyers and thereby alleviate informational asymmetries and facilitate trade. When sellers pay for the certi…cation, however, certi…ers can be tempted to bias their opinion to favour sellers. Indeed, accounting scandals and in ‡ated credit ratings suggest sellers may prefer to select dishonest certi…ers. I test this proposition by estimating the e¤ect of adverse quality signals on audit demand. Exploiting the natural experiment of Arthur Andersen's demise, I …nd that auditors with worse quality signals experience a fall in demand. This suggests that reputation e¤ects are at work even in the presence of con ‡icts of interest.
Introduction
Asymmetric information between seller and buyer can impede mutually bene…cial transactions.
One of the solutions to this problem is to recruit an independent third party -a certi…er -who veri…es unobserved product characteristics for the buyer. The certi…er's independence is at the heart of the tripartite arrangement. This independence, however, can be compromised when sellers pay for the certi…cation. For instance, in the market of auditors and credit rating agencies (CRA) it is not the investor (i.e. the buyer of the security) who pays for the certi…er's services, but the company which is to be impartially rated or audited. In this business model, companies can naturally manipulate their ratings/audits. Furthermore, investors only have a limited power to weed out dishonest certi…ers simply because companies, instead of investors, choose auditors and CRA. Ultimately, these problems can pervert the certi…er's mission to serve the investing community (Dranove and Jin 2010) .
Not surprisingly, this con ‡ict of interest has often been cited as a cause for accounting scandals and, more recently, for in ‡ated credit ratings (e.g. Economist 2004 , BIS-CFGS 2008 .
Auditors and CRA alike refute the criticism of their business model, arguing that the threat of losing their reputation is a su¢ cient disciplinary device (e.g. Economist 2005) .
1 However, this claim has not yet been empirically substantiated.
A successful mechanism of reputation has three components in the presence of con ‡icts of interest. Consider the audit market. 2 First, investors have to punish companies which chose low quality auditors. There is evidence that capital markets severely penalise companies whose audit reports are of dubious quality (e.g. Chaney and Philipich 2002 , GAO 2003a , Pacini and Hillison 2003 , Krishnamurthy et al 2006 . Second, this negative capital market reaction should feed into companies'auditor choice, i.e. companies should choose high quality auditors. Third, auditors then should have the incentive to provide high quality audits. The second stage of 1 An alternative business model where investors would pay for audits and ratings is di¢ cult to implement in practice because free-riding among investors would naturally arise due to easy dissemination of audit reports and ratings.
2 Mathis et al (2009) , for instance, show how reputation can fail to discipline the CRA. There are plenty of anecdotes of 'rating shopping'in the CRA market, but the empirical evidence is scarce and mostly circumstantial (see e.g. Cantor and Packer 1997 , Bongaerts et al 2012 , Stanton and Wallace 2010 this mechanism has not been empirically validated yet. In particular, it has not been analysed whether the adverse capital market reaction to low audit quality feeds into companies'auditor choice and if it does, how. A positive e¤ect of adverse quality signals on audit demand means that …rms prefer to engage lenient auditors in order to receive favourable reports, suggesting that con ‡icts of interest overwhelm reputation concerns and clearly fail the disciplinary mechanism.
A negative e¤ect, on the other hand, indicates that while investors do not pay for audit services, they can exert discipline on auditors indirectly by forcing public companies to choose high quality auditors -a success of reputation.
In this paper, I exploit the natural experiment of Arthur Andersen's collapse and test the e¤ects of audit quality signals on companies' auditor choice in discrete choice models. The quality signals in this study are auditors'industry speci…c …nancial restatement histories, i.e. the proportion of clients in an industry which restated …nancial statements in the past. I …nd that auditors'restatement histories are a crucial driving force in the subsequent auditor choice of deserting Andersen clients.
There are compelling reasons why auditors' …nancial restatement histories should forcibly feed into a company's auditor choice. Restatements are material corrections of published …nan-cial statements which cannot be relied upon anymore and have to be reissued. Since the very role of the independent auditor is to ensure that …nancial statements are fairly presented in all material respects, it appears natural to think that the auditor has not done its job properly if a …nancial statement has to be restated later. Indeed, there is ample evidence that capital markets receive restatements badly. Before Andersen's collapse, restatements hit the restating company hard: on average, they triggered a 10% fall in the company's market value between 1997 (GAO 2003a . Therefore, companies should care about auditors'restatement pro…les if only because capital markets do. Furthermore, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) considers every restatement to be outright audit failure (GAO 2003a) . The demise of Arthur Andersen provides a particularly well suited laboratory to test the importance of quality signals in consumer choice for a number of reasons. First, in empirical analyses of the e¤ects of accreditation, endogenous sample selection is a fundamental problem because the choice of accreditation is most often endogenous (Dranove and Jin 2010) . Similarly, circumstances which trigger auditor switch most probably also a¤ect the choice of the succeeding auditor. By focusing on a forced auditor change, however, this sample selection problem is not an issue in the current empirical investigation. Second, customers in this market are …rms rather than individuals, therefore it is more likely that we should …nd a strong notion of rationality at work. Third, Andersen was one of the big 5 auditors. Therefore, simply choosing one of the remaining big 4 auditors could have appeared insu¢ cient to signal integrity to investors.
Perhaps not surprisingly there were widespread rumours at the time that Arthur Andersen would not be the only one, but merely the …rst one to fail (Economist, 2003a,b) . It seems reasonable then to expect that former Andersen clients paid distinct attention to quality indicators that could potentially di¤erentiate within the exclusive group of big 4 auditors.
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The paper is organized as follows. I review the related literature in Section 2. I describe the estimation procedure in Section 3 and the data in in Section 4. In Section 5, the estimation results are presented. Section 6 discusses robustness and I conclude in Section 7.
Related literature
Con ‡ict of interest is a potentially serious problem. For instance, Hubbard (1998) found that privately owned emission inspection facilities in California are markedly more lenient in their passing behaviour than state facilities because, as Hubbard (2002) showed, customers were more likely to return to inspection stations that have previously passed them. Price et al (2012) argue that NBA referees favour home teams, teams losing during games, and teams losing in playo¤ 4 The determinants of audit quality (proxied by litigation, SEC enforcement actions, restatements, earnings quality, going-concern/client failure, etc) have been investigated at the client level (e.g. independence of board of directors, tenure of engagement, engagement hours worked), the accounting …rm level (…rm size, o¢ ce size, industry experience, etc), the market level (competition, market concentration), and at the level of institutional and legal environment (e.g. legal protection of investors, auditors' legal liability, litigation costs). See Francis (2004 Francis ( , 2011 for comprehensive surveys. This literature, however, has not yet analysed how audit quality a¤ects clients'choice of auditor. series in order to increase consumer demand. Poitras and Sutter (2002) shows that mandatory safety inspection of cars fails to reduce accidents because of policy impotence. Their econometric analysis suggests that evasion of inspection requirements is the likely cause of ine¤ective policy as both drivers and garages can mutually bene…t from conducting pro forma inspections. Lastly, teachers and students alike have an incentive to in ‡ate test scores, especially when short term gains from gaming the rules are higher and the probability of detection is lower (see Jacob and Levitt 2003 and the references therein).
Quality disclosure often fails to a¤ect demand if ratings are di¢ cult to understand (see Dranove and Jin 2010) . Indeed, while the disciplinary force of consumer choice is well established when unobserved quality becomes observable due to some information disclosure (e.g. Foreman and Shea 1999 , Mathios 2000 , Jin and Leslie 2003 , Freedman et al 2012 , previous literature often does not …nd empirical support for imperfect quality signals a¤ecting consumer choice (e.g. Borenstein and Zimmerman 1988 , Hodgkin 1996 , Mocan 2007 , Brown et al 2012 . control for auditor characteristics. 6 There are several studies in addition analysing the forced auditor change of Andersen clients. For instance, Barton (2005) and Chen and Zhou (2007) examine the timing of client defections. Blouin et al (2007) and Kohlbeck et al (2008) 
Econometric framework
I estimate multinomial and nested logit models with auditor and client characteristics. 8 In the multinomial models, company i by choosing auditor j gets utility U ij = W ij + " ij , where W ij is observable up to some parameters and " ij is unobserved by the econometrician. Then, company 7 Financial restatements are, of course, not the only indicators. For instance, auditors'litigation history could also be a straightforward and natural measure. However, the lack of data on litigation constrains the current analysis to …nancial restatements. 8 Multinomial logit with alternative characteristics, i.e. the model where choice is a function of both alternative and individual characteristics, is also known as conditional logit with individual characteristics or simply mixed logit (not to be confused with the random coe¢ cient logit).
i chooses auditor j with probability
( 1) where the second equality follows from the assumption that " ij is independently and identically distributed type I extreme value (Gumbel) (Train 2002). The multinomial model is based on the assumption that the error terms are identically and independently distributed (IID). 9 A logit model which allows correlation within a subset of choices (nest) relaxes the IID assumption to some extent. Therefore, in order to allow for more general substitution patterns, I also estimate nested logits.
In the nested logit speci…cations, both the observable and unobservable components of the utility can be broken down into two parts:
V iB depends only on variables that describe nest B and V ijjB on the variables that describe alternative j in nest B, v iB is the unobserved (stochastic) variation across the nests and v ijjB is the random variation within the nest. Note that the presence of v iB induces correlation across the errors within the nest relaxing the assumption of IID errors. 10 However, across the nests errors are assumed to be independent. Then the choice probabilities in a standard nested logit can be expressed as
where (2)
9 This assumption has a behavioural association with the well known property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The IID (IIA) assumption in most applications is too strong since there might be factors a¤ecting the choice that are not speci…ed in the model and hence can induce correlation in the error terms if these unobserved characteristics share some common components across observations. 10 v iB has a special distribution such that when v ijjB is extreme value distributed so is the total stochastic component " ij = v iB + v ijjB . See e.g. Berry (1994) or Cardell (1997) for more details.
where P ijjB is the conditional probability of choosing alternative i given that an alternative in nest B is chosen, and P iB is the marginal probability of choosing an alternative in nest B.
The parameter B is a measure of the degree of independence in unobserved utility among the alternatives in nest B. I iB is the Inclusive Value or Logsum, the expected utility of choosing an alternative in nest B.
11 The nested logit model is estimated with two nests, one for big 4 (Big) and one for non-big 4 auditors (NonBig). 12 The NonBig nest contains only one alternative (i.e. all the non-big 4 auditors is a single alternative), hence it is degenerate. Note that I am unable to further re…ne the choice set given the small number of companies which chose non-big 4 auditors. The nested logit model is estimated sequentially. 13 It is often not obvious which variables should enter the lower and which ones the upper level of the nest structure. The way I proceed is as follows. First, I estimate a model with all client characteristics entering at the lower level and having a big 4 accountant as a base category. In this way, I can identify variables which have potential variation across nests but not within the Big nest. I add these variables to the upper level step-wise and hence identify the nest-speci…c variables.
In order to estimate the auditor choice models, …rst I need to estimate audit fees. I have data only on the audit fee that a company paid to its newly engaged auditor, but I don't observe the audit fees that the company would have paid to other auditors. Therefore, audit fees must be estimated …rst. To address the possible endogeneity of prices (e.g. simultaneity bias), I
instrument audit fees by a dummy (DEC) which switches on if the company's …nancial year ends in December (see next section). The estimation of audit fees proceeds as follows. First I regress audit fees on di¤erent client characteristics including the instrument over the whole 11 In other words, it is a weighted average of the utilities associated with the alternatives within the nest, where the weights are probabilities of choosing each alternative.
12 In many empirical analyses, the nests are not obvious a priori and, therefore, an elaborate range of experiments is often necessary to identify the nest structure that best describes the data (Koppelman and Bhat 2006) . However, in the current context the industry con…guration of big 4 versus non-big 4 auditors clearly lends itself to a natural partition of the choice set. Therefore, I do not dwell on exploring di¤erent nesting structures.
13 P iB and P ijjB correspond to two logit models, one for the upper ("choice between nests") and one for the lower level ("choice within nest"). The two logit models can be estimated separately (Limited Information Maximum Likelihood, LIML) or jointly (Full Information Maximum Likelihood, FIML). Although FIML is more e¢ cient, the numerical maximisation is much more complicated due to the fact that the joint maximum likelihood function is not globally concave. Since I bootstrap the results, the FIML is computationally expensive and hence the nested logit models are estimated sequentially.
sample and identify the model that best describes the relationship. Then this model is estimated separately on the …ve subsamples, which correspond to the …ve alternatives of the choice set.
That is, one regression is run on the sample of companies which chose PWC, then another one on EY clients, etc. These …ve estimated equations are the pricing equations. Calculating the …tted values of these pricing equations for every company in the whole sample, I generate …ve audit fees (one for each alternative) for each company.
14 These audit fees along with other variables enter the second stage choice models as a regressor, which results in consistent estimates (Pagan 1986 , Wooldridge 2010).
Since I have generated regressors and I also correct for the endogeneity of audit fees, the standard errors are, of course, incorrect in the second stage. Therefore, I use nonparametric bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications in all choice models where audit fees enter as a regressor. The bootstrap procedure applied is as follows. In each simulation, I take a bootstrap sample from each client set that chose a particular auditor and using these samples I estimate the audit fee regressions for each auditor (pricing equations). Using these regressions, I generate audit fees for all clients in the whole sample. Then I take a bootstrap sample from the whole sample and run the choice model. This procedure is repeated 1000 times. Since audit fees get regenerated in each simulation step, the …rst stage variation feeds into the second stage resulting in asymptotically correct standard errors.
Identi…cation
In all choice models in this study, identi…cation relies on an exclusion restriction which takes the form of an instrument a¤ecting audit fees but not auditor choice. The instrument DEC dummy takes the value one if the company's …nancial year ends in December and zero otherwise.
Financial year end a¤ects audit fees because of the auditor's uneven workload during the year.
In particular, for about two-third of companies (both in my sample and in the population) the …nancial year ends in December putting auditors under strong pressure in the period of January -March, while other months of the year are less busy. Therefore, if a company requires audit out of "rush months", it gets a discount.
However, the end of …nancial year is clearly exogenous to the choice. 15 In other words, when exactly during the year the company requires an audit does not a¤ect directly which auditor the company chooses; there is only an indirect e¤ect through audit fees. It is hard to imagine a direct causal relationship between choice and the end of the company's …nancial year, which would render the instrument invalid. In principle, in the presence of binding capacity constraint an auditor might be unable to take on a client which would further strain its busy period, while it could easily accommodate a company with a …nancial year ending, say, in June. 16 Four observations work against this argument. First, binding capacity constraints in general apply only in the short run. The audit technology is predominantly labour intensive and therefore capacity can in principle be ‡exible even in the short run. Second, most of the clients switched from Andersen in the …rst half of the year leaving enough time for auditors to adjust their capacity for the next "audit peak" in the following year if they needed to. 17 Three, while the demand for the services of the remaining auditors increased considerably due to Andersen's failure, the supply of auditors also rose due to sta¤ leaving the collapsing audit …rm. These three arguments suggest that factor (labour) demand was not completely inelastic: a (possibly unusually high) wage existed at which accounting talent can be hired and, therefore, so did a (possibly unusually high) audit fee at which a client can be accepted regardless of her …nancial 15 Most new businesses can choose their …nancial year end (unless the business is taxed as a sole proprietorship). However, once the corporation's …rst tax returns have been submitted to Internal Revenue Services (IRS), it is quite di¢ cult to change the end of the …nancial year: any change requires the prior agreement of the IRS and an important business reason is usually needed for approval. Furthermore, states often have further rules that the company has to comply with (e.g. in Colorado …scal year end can be changed only once in every ten years). The choice of …nancial year can depend on many factors, of which the most important are as follows: when the company is incorporated, the company's business cycle, whether the company is a subsidiary, and the applicable tax environment. 16 Note that this argument would also defeat the whole modelling concept since it is assumed that companies choose auditors and not vica versa.
17 One may object saying trying to re-establish the integrity of their …nancials, some companies required an immediate audit on previous years'…nancial statements. Note that, however, since most of the auditor changes took place in the …rst half of the year, an immediate audit meant for the auditor "work out of rush months" implying unlikely capacity problems. year end. That is, there was an audit fee at which any auditor would have been willing and able to expand capacity implying that the end of …nancial year a¤ects choice only through audit fees. Lastly, note that indeed each big 4 auditor and also non-big 4 auditors engaged Andersen clients of both types (i.e. companies with …nancial year ending in December and in other months) which again suggests against the idea of binding capacity constraints. Therefore, I regard my instrument as strongly exogenous. 20 Supposedly, clients pay less attention to the overall restatement history of the auditor, they are more concerned about auditor performance in their own industry. This seems an innocuous and intuitive assumption. There was no statistics published on restatements prior to Andersen's demise. However, individual restatements were announced in the media, so a company which follows industry news closely can form an opinion of the industry speci…c restatement pro…les of auditors. Note that AuditAnalytics data didn't allow me to calculate longer restatement history than two years. 21 GAO has an alternative database on restatements (GAO 2003a). However, this database didn't allow me to identify the industries of restating companies, hence REST could only vary with auditor in this case. market share (assets) of companies that an auditor audited in a given industry. Thus REST and INDEXP vary with auditor and industry. 22 As mentioned before, audit fees (FEES) are estimated as a function of client characteristics. FEES varies with auditor and client.
In addition, I control for a wide range of client characteristics through four dimensions:
size, complexity, pro…tability and risk. These measures are based on balance sheet and income statement data and come from both AuditAnalytics and Compustat. For the summary statistics of client and auditor characteristics, see Table 1 and 2.
( Table 1 and 2 about here)
Results
First, I discuss the results of the …rst stage estimations, the audit fee regressions. Next, I
present multinomial and nested logit estimations where choice is a function of both auditor and client characteristics. In the choice models, where the models are run on the whole sample, the …ve alternatives are PWC, EY, Deloitte, KPMG and NonBig, the latter being non-big 4 public accountants as a …fth single alternative. 23 In the nested logit framework I explicitly make the distinction between the two groups of big 4 and non-big 4 auditors.
Consequently, it would be perfectly correlated with auditor …xed e¤ects in multinomial and nested logit models. In conditional logit settings the GAO and the AuditAnalytics data yielded qualitatively same results (see Toth 2011) . 22 I estimated conditional logits, where I could compare estimates when REST and INDEXP variables vary only with auditor, with auditor and industry, and with auditor, industry and time. Furthermore, in models when REST and INDEXP vary only with auditor, I could compare the robustness of my …ndings with respect to alternative datasets as well as di¤erent horizons of restatement histories, i.e. when REST and INDEXP are calculated based on two years restatement history (AuditAnalytics) and when they are calculated based on 5 years history (GAO database) prior to Andersen demise. The qualitative results are identical across all these models (See Toth 2011) . 23 Note that in the current study the set of non-big 4 auditors consists of only a handful of auditors, those that former Andersen clients ended up choosing. Therefore, throughout the study I will refrain from drawing far reaching conclusions regarding the choice between the sets of big and non-big 4 auditors.
Audit fee regressions
In the …rst stage, I estimate models of the following general form:
The audit fee regressions for all (big 4 and non-big 4) clients can be found in Table 3 ; the regressions for big 4 clients only are in Table 4 . In both tables client characteristics robustly predict auditor fees. In the …nal models, 74% of the variation in audit fees is explained, a standard …gure in the audit fee literature. All the variables have the right signs and most of them are signi…cant at the 1% level consistently across all models. Perhaps surprisingly, both the signi…cance and the magnitude of the parameters appear very similar in the two tables. Model (6) in Table 3 is estimated separately on the …ve subsamples of clients corresponding to the …ve alternatives (not reported) and using these pricing equations …ve audit fees are generated for each company. The summary result of these estimations can be found in the summary statistics in Table 1 under the heading of Auditor Characteristics.
( Table 3 and 4 about here)
Multinomial and nested logit models
In this section, I estimate multinomial models (1), where and log(FEES ij ) is a generated regressor from the …rst stage estimations. 24 I also estimate nested logit speci…cations (2), where Note that since the NonBig nest is degenerate, the coe¢ cient of IV iN onBig is one and it's not identi…ed (See e.g. Heiss 2002 ). As discussed earlier, the nested logit model is estimated sequentially. Assets and Leverage are nest speci…c variables and identi…ed in a step-wise procedure (see Section 3). Importantly, all multinomial and nested models are estimated with auditor speci…c intercepts j , which act as auditor …xed e¤ects in this setting.
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See Table 5 .2) However, the models have also been estimated when audit fees are unlogged in both the …rst and second stages and also when audit fees are logged in the …rst and unlogged in the second stage; the main results are completely invariant to this speci…cation issue.
25 Several studies investigated how big 4 auditors' strategy of purchasing Andersen o¢ ces a¤ected clients' auditor choice. Blouin et al (2007) argues clients with smaller agency and bigger switching costs were more likely to migrate with their previous audit team. However, Blouin et al do not distinguish clients which switched before and after an o¢ ce was purchased; therefore, it is unable to shed light on whether clients followed their former (Andersen) audit team or in fact the audit team followed its clients. Indeed, Kohlbeck et al (2008) …nd that in their sample the auditor switch decision of 63% of clients was clearly not a¤ected by auditors' o¢ ce purchase because either clients (42%) switched earlier than the o¢ ce was purchased or clients (21%) belonged to o¢ ces that were never purchased. Furthermore, Kohlbeck et al (2008) also analysed the determinants of the probability of o¢ ce purchase: they do …nd evidence that auditors purchased o¢ ces to hire Andersen sta¤ in order to ease sta¢ ng shortages brought about by Andersen clients which had already switched to them by then. See also Ramnath and Weber (2008) . Nevertheless, I control for the potentially di¤erent o¢ ce purchase strategies of auditors (e.g. PWC didn't buy any Andersen o¢ ces) and other unobserved factors through auditor …xed e¤ects in the choice models. Table 5 . The audit fee variable is signi…cant in the nested logit model (8) and it has the expected negative sign across all models. Interestingly, model (7) in Table 5 Table 5 .
( Table 5 about here) Next, I investigate whether the sensitivity of audit demand to perceived quality varies with clients' size, risk or pro…tability in a multinomial setting. With the aid of interaction terms, I break down the e¤ect of the variables into a client-invariant and client-varying components.
The main message from Table 6 is that restatements are evaluated very similarly across clients: none of the restatement interaction terms is signi…cant at conventional levels.
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(Table 6 about here)
Robustness
The results suggest that …nancial restatement history is a key driving force of auditor choice.
However, some caveats are in order.
There is no within industry variation in REST and INDEXP which renders it impossible to control for unobserved industry e¤ects in the choice models. In principle, there should be some time variation in restatement histories due to the fact that Andersen clients dismissed their former auditor at di¤erent points of times. However, this variation proved insu¢ cient for 26 Before bootstrapping some of the interaction terms between REST and size measures (Assets and Market Value) were weakly signi…cant (10%). One may want to blame the ine¢ cient estimation procedure for the lack of client-varying e¤ects.
identi…cation since the vast majority of companies dismissed Andersen between March and June 2002. In other words, the information in the data have been fully exhausted.
While it is very reasonable to assume that unobserved industry e¤ects play a role in the audit fee regressions (hence the inclusion of industry dummies), it is more di¢ cult to argue that there are industry e¤ects in auditor choice that INDEXP and REST variables do not already account for. Nevertheless, one way to account for unobserved industry e¤ects is to recreate REST and INDEXP using a …ner industry classi…cation than the industry dummies. Therefore, I recalculate REST and INDEXP (by splitting, for instance, Trade into Retail and Wholesales Trade) and rerun equations (1) and (2) of Table 5 adding the full set of (coarser) industry dummies. The results are equations (3) and (4) in Table 5 . Although controlling for unobserved industry e¤ects causes the signi…cance of the variable of interest, REST, to fade slightly, the point estimates are strikingly similar and robustly signi…cant at the …ve percent level. This reinforces the argument that unobserved industry e¤ects do not confound the results.
Conclusion
In this paper, I tested whether the mechanism of reputation was operational in the audit industry following a market debacle and I …nd that it was. Market crises, therefore, do not necessarily indicate lack of discipline. In fact the analysis suggests that reputation can work even when it is based on noisy quality signals and when the mechanism is tainted by con ‡icts of interest.
The …ndings have important lessons for not only the audit industry but for the market of credit ratings too. The CRA industry played an instrumental role in the recent …nancial crisis and the con ‡ict of interest created by the issuer-pays business model has been the prime suspect for its alleged malfunction. Therefore, testing reputation e¤ects in the audit industry, which applies the exact same business model and hence su¤ers from similar con ‡icts of interest, should be an informative exercise for the market of credit ratings.
The current study also informs the debate on regulatory policy after market crises. On the one hand, market crises can signal a broken mechanism of reputation: as the popular argument goes, market debacles lay bare the market's inability to prevent corporate malpractice. Indeed, Andersen's collapse and the alleged market failure swiftly led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and the establishment of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, an auditor watchdog, which were primarily intended to rectify a broken audit market (Economist 2007) . On the other hand, market crises can be the very result of reputation at work. Furthermore, they can also lead to an e¤ective disciplinary mechanism where there was none before if markets learn. Therefore, regulation, although popular, may not be the most adequate response to crises if reputation has the potential to discipline. Instead, enhancing this market mechanism can be more promising: e.g. Jin and Leslie (2003) shows that information disclosure can dramatically improve the workings of reputation. Therefore, public collection and disclosure of data on underlying audit and rating quality could go a long way to improving discipline in these markets.
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